On a rainy
day in June 1962, two newsmen who provided invaluable service for the Associated
Press for many years to come arrived in Saigon to help bolster the efforts of AP
bureau chief Malcolm W. Browne. The journalists were reporter Peter Arnett,
born and raised in New Zealand, and photographer Horst Faas, survivor of a
war-torn upbringing in Berlin, Germany, during World War II.
The three
men would all go on to win Pulitzer Prizes for their work in Vietnam and reported
about the war for many years (Browne left the country in 1966, later to return;
Faas stayed until 1973; and Arnett remained for North Vietnam’s victory in 1975).
“I was 27, a gadfly in the journalistic backwaters of Southeast Asia,” noted
Arnett, who had worked for the
Bangkok World newspaper in Thailand and
Laos before joining the AP. He had already been kicked out of three countries in a region, Arnett noted, “where
you have not really made the grade with Old China hands until you have been
expelled from at least six.”
The
newcomers soon learned, as Browne later pointed out, that the main issues in
covering the war centered on the issue of “whether a reporter should merely
observe the scene and pass on what is approved by the commanding officer, or
whether he should get himself completely apart from the local authorities and
stick his nose where it was not wanted. Particularly for the news service
reporter who must present an accurate, fair and balanced report, the dilemma
poses terrible problems.”
Arnett had
stuffed all his worldly possessions, including a red-tasseled ceremonial tribal
sword from Laos that he hung on the wall of his room at the Caravelle Hotel, inside
of two scruffy suitcases. It was not the first time he had been in Saigon. Four
years earlier, Arnett and his girlfriend, Myrtle, had visited the city as
“penniless” tourists. He did not expect to stay in his new posting for long.
“There was still a desperate quality about the country and its people that I
remembered from my first visit and that had unfolded in newspaper headlines
since that time: the attempted coups d’état against the dictatorial family
regime, and the ferocious guerrilla insurgency that made the chaotic events I
had witnessed in neighboring Thailand, Laos and Indonesia seem mild by
comparison,” he noted.
To Arnett,
Saigon seemed a much more “Americanized” city than others in Southeast Asia. He
could see young men in crew cuts—U.S. advisers on leave wearing civilian
clothes—looking to grab drinks at bars and trying to find rooms in hotels. The
families of the American diplomats, senior military officers, consultants, and
civilian aid workers seemed to be prepared to stay in the country for a long
time. Arnett picked up a pamphlet at the U.S. Embassy advising the “new
arrivals to bring necessary items unavailable here, including ‘card tables with
additional round folding tops, seating six or nine, available at Sears, $6.95;
ice cream freezer, hand operated, Sears, $10.97; playing cards forbidden to be
sold here; picnic equipment with portable ice chests; folding aluminum tables;
Thermos jugs; beach umbrella (two and one-half hours to beach),’ along with
other items.”
Arnett had
heard disquieting comments from AP people based in Asia that Browne “was
something of an intellectual bore,” who had “kept his own counsel” and appeared
distant to those who had visited the Saigon bureau. While most AP stories were
short, the news service’s management allowed Browne to send over the wires
long, two-thousand or three thousand-word pieces “about his adventures going
out with Vietnamese troops, going to the highlands,” Arnett recalled. Although
Wes Gallagher, the man who hired Browne and the wire service’s new general
manager and chief executive, believed the longer dispatches added great value
to what the agency offered its member newspapers, the “regular AP guys are
saying, ‘What’s a 3,000-word story doing on the wire?’” Arnett recalled.
When
Arnett presented himself for work at the AP’s office the day after his arrival,
Browne experienced some initial misgivings about his new associate, as the New
Zealander seemed “a little bewildered.” Noticing Arnett’s small stature (about
five feet, six inches tall), Browne worried that he might be someone who could
be easily browbeaten by “all of the rotten stuff that went on in Vietnam those
days, lying bureaucrats, lying military officers,” as well as being too polite
to stand up for himself.
In about
an hour, however, Browne’s doubts had melted away as Arnett started “swearing
like a trooper and bawling into the telephone and getting on his combat togs
and going out and doing the Arnett thing.” Later, one of his fellow newsmen
noted that if someone had been asked to design the ideal reporter to cover the Vietnam
war, Arnett would have met all the requirements. As for Arnett, he recognized,
as some people had suggested, that he might have compensated for his small
stature “with a pugnacious attitude,” but he had learned during his years in
the journalism profession that “a shrinking violet doesn’t get the story.”
Arnett also
changed his initial assessment about his bureau chief. He realized that Browne
possessed an intensity and directness that made him stand apart from the
“easygoing attitude of the American journalists I had met up to that time.” The
two men worked smoothly together, with Arnett enjoying Browne’s intellect and how
he held governmental officials accountable for their actions. “He was into the
story,” Arnett noted. “He gave me fascinating documents and books to read about
the Viet Cong and the history of the war.”

The young reporter quickly became enamored with a twenty-four-page guide to news coverage in Vietnam Browne
had prepared to help acclimate him to his new surroundings. Arnett had heard of
the guide through the AP rumor mill, with most of the comments about it
negative, especially from veteran newsmen “who figured they had nothing left to
learn.” Arnett, however, believed that Browne’s pamphlet contained the finest
journalism instruction he had ever received and added that if “the military had
anything similar it would be classified!” Poring over the manual, he paid great
attention to the pointers it offered for how to cover guerrilla warfare. Browne
advised those who went out into the field the following:
"Try
to keep in good physical condition so you can march or run for a reasonable
distance. You might have to save your life doing this at some point. You should
know how to swim. Canals and ditches often are above your head.
If
you hear a shot and think it’s not from your own side, don’t get up and look
around to see where it came from. The second shot might get you. Lie prone
under fire, and move only on your belly. Look for cover and move toward it.
When
moving with troops DO NOT stay close to the head of a column or the “point man”
in a formation. Professional soldiers are paid to do this. DO NOT stand or
march next to a radio man or an aid man. They are prime targets. Stick close to
the commander, who is generally in the safest position available. The whole
idea of covering an operation is to GET THE NEWS AND PICTURES BACK, not to play
soldier yourself.
When
moving through enemy territory (a good part of Viet Nam is enemy territory)
watch your feet. Spikes, mines, concealed pits and booby traps are everywhere.
When possible, step in exactly the same places as the soldier ahead of you. If
he wasn’t blown up, you probably won’t be."
In his memoirs Arnett remembered that after reading Browne’s
extraordinary document, he looked up to scan the items decorating the AP
office’s walls. What came next encapsulated the personalities of the two
journalists. Arnett spied what he believed to be a twig hanging on one part of
the wall. Upon another glance, however, he saw that it was a “blackened human
hand,” which he later learned had been discovered at a Viet Cong ambush and returned
to the office by part-time AP photographer Le Minh. Another macabre souvenir
Arnett recalled was a bamboo water container stained with a red liquid that
office assistant Bill Ha Van Tran told him was human blood.
Browne’s
memory had less-sensational details for the office’s battlefield mementos. He
admitted to having a photograph of a severed hand stuck to the wall, but not the
real thing. “And yes,” he noted, “there was a bamboo-log canteen . . . that I
had brought back from an ambush, but it was stained with rotting sugar water,
not blood.”
Born in
Berlin, Germany, in 1933, the same year Adolf Hitler came to power, the husky Faas
was familiar with the “dangers of war and the effects of war and bombing and
shooting.” Hired as a photographer by the AP in late 1955, he had been exposed
to the dangers of combat in both the Republic of the Congo and Algeria, as well
as the pressure of being a wire-service employee. “Working for the AP it was
always that you worked in fear,” Faas remembered, including fear about events
that have not yet happened, and when they did they “invariably happened at
three in the morning.”
The AP sent
him to Saigon to bolster the quality of photography issued by the bureau. (Faas
learned that a stringer cameraman had been reusing film he had shot on previous
military operations and passing them off as new engagements.) Arnett had worked
with the German in Laos and found him to be very competitive and single-minded about
completing his assignments. Arnett remembered Faas responding to a compliment
from him about one of his photographs with what could have been his motto:
“Great photographers are not born, they just get up earlier in the morning.” Faas
considered Browne to be quite different from any of the people he has come
across working for the AP: “Very serious. Very studious. . . . And very good
sources.” Staffers sometimes had to vacate the office so that Browne could talk
with his informants about sensitive matters in private, according to Faas.
Despite
his bulk (more than two hundred pounds), Faas believed in pursuing a story no
matter where it occurred. “If something is happening somewhere, get there—by
foot, or bus, or boat,” he advised. “If you’re not fast you’ll miss it all.” Faas
blanched at relying on Saigon photo shops to develop the bureau’s film. He
decided to commandeer the AP office’s single bathroom, the only water source
available, and turned it into his darkroom. He filled the cramped space with
the equipment he needed, sometimes improvising, using, for example, large clay
pots to hold the chemicals for developing film. Faas also convinced Pham Van
Huan, the bureau’s office boy, to assist him in the darkroom.
Browne
marveled at Faas’s efficient operation, finding him to be a “delightful guy,
very friendly and warm and a terrific sort of person, but still, he could be an
awful kraut [German] sometimes.” Faas also equipped himself for his work by visiting
Saigon’s black market to purchase army trousers and a jacket, replacing the
insignias with a nametag that also emphasized his affiliation with the AP, as
well as a jungle cap, backpack, hammock, and several water bottles. “This was
when everything on the market was still old French or Vietnamese source,
Vietnamese supplies; they didn’t have all that fancy, fancy gear the Americans
came with later on,” Faas noted.
Faas always wanted to be properly equipped so he
did not have to “depend in any way on troops in the field.” Arnett remembered
that Horst set himself off from other photojournalists, who had been
transitioning from using the clumsy Speed Graphic cameras of the Korean War to
the smaller Rolleiflex models. “Horst used the 35mm Leica series, small finely
machined cameras that he hung around his neck like Hawaiian leis,” Arnett
reported.
Browne learned
that Arnett and Faas were “absolutely fearless” when it came to visiting the most
violent combat zones, complete with fire coming from all directions and “people
dropping like flies.” Although intrepid, Faas, who came to be considered one of
the best photographers to document the war, proved to be prudent when it came
to risking his life, believing that no picture was worth being wounded or
killed. “If there is a good chance, an overwhelming chance that you are about
to get hurt by doing something,” he later explained, “don’t do it.”
Faas made
it a habit to always be the first person to exit a helicopter, as he believed
that the excitement of the first encounter caused the enemy’s aim to be
inaccurate. He also tried to check the quality of the troops he accompanied
into battle, avoiding those armed with poorly maintained weapons or displaying
other signs of ineptitude or bad leadership. “I thought he was the smartest of
us,” recalled Richard Pyle, later Saigon bureau chief for the AP. “We would be
thinking of what was going to happen and after that happened, what would happen
next, but Horst was always thinking what would happen after that. He was
always one or two steps ahead of the rest of us.”
Arnett and
Faas developed into a superb team, so much so that Charley Mohr, who covered
the Vietnam War for Time magazine and later the New York Times,
lamented that if he heard about a big battle in the Central Highlands and managed
to make his way to the area on a plane or helicopter he would inevitably “find
that Peter and Horst had already been there and were back in Saigon filing [their
story].”
Everybody
in the Saigon AP office did what was required to fill the agency’s rapacious
appetite for news. Luckily for Browne, the office in Saigon was different from
other AP bureaus. While bureau chiefs in other locations had to sometimes spend
more time on “member relations, contracts and so forth as on news,” he did not
have to deal with such bureaucratic tasks. “Things tend to run themselves,” he
said, “thanks to the very high caliber of our people here.” Browne maintained a
policy that “all correspondents should take pictures whenever possible, and all
photographers should gather material for stories.”
On operations Faas snapped “superb”
photographs with his Leica cameras, and gathered material that, when he
returned to the office, he would work on with Arnett to fashion into a story
they could send out on the wires. Both Browne and Arnett took cameras with them
and used them, bringing back images that, if fuzzy, underexposed, or
overexposed, Faas could use his darkroom wizardry to produce a decent
photograph. Faas advised the reporters on the proper shutter speed and f-stop
(aperture measurement) to use and told them: “Set the distance at six feet.
Don’t move the camera; don’t focus. Just look through the viewfinder and—click!
Click only when things are moving. Don’t click when people are standing still
and looking at you.”
Even with
the added manpower, Browne realized that his bureau could not be everywhere,
and he had to manage his resources with great care. “There is no single front
anywhere in Viet Nam, but a hundred battlefields, where the war flickers on and
off like summer lightning,” he said. “Coverage means a seven-day week for
everyone.” Daily Browne could never tell where the next attack might come from,
either from the ARVN or the VC. He had to “gamble constantly” when it came to
picking areas to cover.
In
addition to hitching rides into battle on U.S. Army helicopters, Browne and his
staff had access to a battered, but “very serviceable,” British Land Rover, one
of his first purchases he had made as bureau chief. The vehicle’s off-road
capability saved AP staffers’ lives more than once, as they did not have to
stick to main road when encountering “a road block or some kind of nastiness up
ahead, we could always sort of swivel off. Even through swamps if they weren’t
too mushy, we could get through them,” Browne remembered
A
not-so-dispassionate observer, David Halberstam of the New York Times,
who arrived to cover the Vietnam conflict for the paper of record in September
1962, commented that Browne imparted an important tone to the bureau in two
ways. First, he stood behind his staff when they were “challenged by the Saigon
officialdom, something which was very important, and which greatly liberated
those who worked for him to give their best work,” Halberstam noted.
Additionally,
Halberstam recalled that Browne never “big-footed the story,” which prevented
any “pettiness and back-biting” among the staff. Browne was able to do this,
Halberstam added, because he believed hogging the story was “morally wrong, and
because his own philosophy which soon became the philosophy of Arnett and Faas
as well, was that there was going to be enough here for everyone—plenty of war,
plenty of heartbreak, plenty of stories.”